Preparing for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases: Example of a high-level isolation unit.

INTRODUCTION: Patients with high-consequence infectious diseases (HCID) are rare in Western Europe. However, high-level isolation units (HLIU) must always be prepared for patient admission. Case fatality rates of HCID can be reduced by providing optimal intensive care management. We here describe a single centre's preparation, its embedding in the national context and the challenges we faced during the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic. METHODS: Ten team leaders organize monthly whole day trainings for a team of doctors and nurses from the HLIU focusing on intensive care medicine. Impact and relevance of training are assessed by a questionnaire and a perception survey, respectively. Furthermore, yearly exercises with several partner institutions are performed to cover different real-life scenarios. Exercises are evaluated by internal and external observers. Both training sessions and exercises are accompanied by intense feedback. RESULTS: From May 2017 monthly training sessions were held with a two-month and a seven-month break due to the first and second wave of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, respectively. Agreement with the statements of the questionnaire was higher after training compared to before training indicating a positive effect of training sessions on competence. Participants rated joint trainings for nurses and doctors at regular intervals as important. Numerous issues with potential for improvement were identified during post processing of exercises. Action plans for their improvement were drafted and as of now mostly implemented. The network of the permanent working group of competence and treatment centres for HCID (Ständiger Arbeitskreis der Kompetenz- und Behandlungszentren für Krankheiten durch hochpathogene Erreger (STAKOB)) at the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) was strengthened throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. DISCUSSION: Adequate preparation for the admission of patients with HCID is challenging. We show that joint regular trainings of doctors and nurses are appreciated and that training sessions may improve perceived skills. We also show that real-life scenario exercises may reveal additional deficits, which cannot be easily disclosed in training sessions. Although the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic interfered with our activities the enhanced cooperation among German HLIU during the pandemic ensured constant readiness for the admission of HCID patients to our or to collaborating HLIU. This is a single centre's experience, which may not be generalized to other centres. However, we believe that our work may address aspects that should be considered when preparing a unit for the admission of patients with HCID. These may then be adapted to the local situations.

The Impact of COVID-19 Containment Actions on Extra-Analytical Phases of the Clinical Laboratory: A Case Report.

Laboratory information systems need to adapt to new demands created by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has set up new normals like containment measures and social distancing. Some of these have negatively impacted the pre- and postanalytical phases of laboratory testing. Here, we present an intriguing finding related to the generation of the accession number/specimen number on the investigation module of a hospital management information system and its impact on the dissemination of reports resulting in the wrong release of reports on a female patient amidst the background of COVID-19 containment measures. We analyze the situation that led to this false reporting and the importance of the proper customization of information software in laboratories along with a robust postanalytical framework of laboratory work culture to avert such untoward incidents. This introspection has made us realize that COVID-19 has been a scientific, medical, and social challenge. We need to redefine our priorities in the days to come because SARS-CoV-2 is here to stay.

Prevention and control measures of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in low-risk departments: The spine surgery department example.

As the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spreads globally, hospital departments will need take steps to manage their treatment procedures and wards. The preparations of high-risk departments (infection, respiratory, emergency, and intensive care unit) were relatively well within this pandemic, while low-risk departments may be unprepared. The spine surgery department in The First Affiliated Hospital of Anhui Medical University in Hefei, China, was used as an example in this study. The spine surgery department took measures to manage the patients, medical staff and wards to avoid the cross-infection within hospital. During the outbreak, no patients or healthcare workers were infected, and no treatment was delayed due to these measures. The prevention and control measures effectively reduced the risk of nosocomial transmission between health workers and patients while providing optimum care. It was a feasible management approach that was applicable to most low-risk and even high-risk departments.

Preparing Frontline Hospitals for Dangerous Special Pathogens Beyond Ebola.

Frontline hospitals are at the forefront of all travel-related, emerging and reemerging infectious diseases and special pathogens. Yet, the readiness of frontline hospitals and their ability to identify, isolate, and inform on Ebola and other special pathogens is uncertain. This article addresses the resources necessary to support screening for Ebola and other special pathogens and presents the decision-making algorithm for the transport of patients with high-consequence infectious diseases within the New York City Health + Hospitals integrated healthcare delivery network, which includes 10 frontline hospitals and the Region 2 Ebola and Other Special Pathogen Treatment Center.

Learning from the first wave: Lessons about managing patient flow and resource utilization on medical wards at providence health during the COVID-19 pandemic.

We report the successful implementation of a modified Traffic Control Bundling (TCB) protocol called "Red, Yellow and Green" on the inpatient medical units at St. Paul's Hospital in Vancouver, Canada during the first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The modified TCB protocol demonstrates an important example on how hospitals can rapidly reorganize operational and clinical processes to reallocate existing capacity to minimize exposure, improve traffic flow and reduce nosocomial transmissions of COVID-19 to health care workers (HCWs) and other patients. Preliminary evidence demonstrates the benefits on how an existing facility can be redesigned for adjustable ward capacity to provide disease containment under a context of uncertainty of disease transmission and varying patient load. Important lessons in preparation for the evolution of the pandemic fall into categories of risk management, capacity and demand management.

Quarantine Facility for Patients with COVID-19 with Mild Symptoms in Korea: Experience from Eighteen Residential Treatment Centers.

With the rapid spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a particularly sharp increase in the number of confirmed cases in Daegu and Gyeongbuk regions at the end of February, Korea faced an unprecedented shortage of medical resources, including hospital beds. To cope with this shortage, the government introduced a severity scoring system for patients with COVID-19 and designed a new type of quarantine facility for treating and isolating patients with mild symptoms out of the hospital, namely, the Residential Treatment Center (RTC). A patient with mild symptoms was immediately isolated in the RTC and continuously monitored to detect changes in symptoms. If the symptoms aggravate, the patient was transferred to a hospital. RTCs were designed by creating a quarantine environment in existing lodging facilities capable of accommodating > 100 individuals. The facilities were entirely divided into a clean zone (working area) and contaminated zone (patient zone), separating the space, air, and movement routes, and the staff wore level D personal protective equipment (PPE) in the contaminated zone. The staffs consisted of medical personnel, police officers, soldiers, and operation personnel, and worked in two or three shifts per day. Their duty was mainly to monitor the health conditions of quarantined patients, provide accommodations, and regularly collect specimens to determine if they can be released. For the past two months, RTCs secured approximately 4,000 isolation rooms and treated approximately 3,000 patients with mild symptoms and operated stably without additional spread of the disease in and out of the centers. Based on these experience, we would like to suggest the utilization of RTCs as strategic quarantine facilities in pandemic situations.

Breast reconstruction with immediate autologous free tissue transfer in a peri-operative COVID-19 positive patient: A case report illustrating feasibility of aftercare.

Globally, there has been a measured response to rationalise elective operating during the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. In terms of breast cancer care, this has led to a restricted provision of reconstruction with autologous free tissue transfer. A primary concern is the risk of mortality in elective surgery patients who develop COVID-19. The aim of this report is to describe the observed physiological impact of the virus on our patient, and to address how outpatient care after autologous free tissue transfer can be delivered to COVID-19 positive patients. In March 2020, we performed a bilateral breast reconstruction with a deep inferior epigastric perforator flap and a superficial inferior epigastric perforator flap. The patient became symptomatic on day three post-operatively, tested positive for COVID-19 and was discharged home. Drain and dressing management was continued through the use of telemedicine. Two weeks following the operation, a breast seroma formed that was drained semi-electively in the COVID-19 positive area of the Emergency Department. The patient visited the dressing clinic twice in total and healed after three weeks. Despite undergoing complex surgery and having pre-operative chemotherapy, our patient suffered a mild form of the virus limited to upper respiratory symptoms. Physiologically we did not see any significant difference to that of the normal post-operative course. This case demonstrates the possibility of managing autologous breast reconstruction patients using telemedicine. Although COVID-19 can complicate, or even be fatal, in the perioperative course, our patient thankfully suffered no discernable negative outcome from her infection.

Implementation of an Algorithm of Cohort Classification to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 in Nursing Homes.

Older adults living in nursing homes are the most vulnerable group of the COVID-19 pandemic. There are many difficulties in isolating residents and limiting the spread in this setting. We have developed a simple algorithm with a traffic light format for resident classification and sectorization within nursing homes, based on basic diagnostic tests, surveillance of symptoms onset, and close contact monitoring. We have implemented the algorithm in several centers with good data on adherence. Suggestions for implementation and evaluation are discussed.

The role of dedicated biocontainment patient care units in preparing for COVID-19 and other infectious disease outbreaks.

In response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014-2016, the US Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) established 10 regional treatment centers, called biocontainment units (BCUs), to prepare and provide care for patients infected with high-consequence pathogens. Many of these BCUs were among the first units to activate for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patient care. The activities of the Johns Hopkins BCU helped prepare the Johns Hopkins Health System for COVID-19 in the 3 domains of containment care: (1) preparedness planning, education and training, (2) patient care and unit operations, and (3) research and innovation. Here, we describe the role of the JH BCU in the Hopkins COVID-19 response to illustrate the value of BCUs in the current pandemic and their potential role in preparing healthcare facilities and health systems for future infectious disease threats.

Epidemiological Investigation of the First 135 COVID-19 Cases in Brunei: Implications for Surveillance, Control, and Travel Restrictions.

Studies on the early introduction of SARS-CoV-2 in a naive population have important epidemic control implications. We report findings from the epidemiological investigation of the initial 135 COVID-19 cases in Brunei and describe the impact of control measures and travel restrictions. Epidemiological and clinical information was obtained for all confirmed COVID-19 cases, whose symptom onset was from March 9 to April 5, 2020. The basic reproduction number (R0), incubation period, and serial interval (SI) were calculated. Time-varying R was estimated to assess the effectiveness of control measures. Of the 135 cases detected, 53 (39.3%) were imported. The median age was 36 (range = 0.5-72) years. Forty-one (30.4%) and 13 (9.6%) were presymptomatic and asymptomatic cases, respectively. The median incubation period was 5 days (interquartile range [IQR] = 5, range = 1-11), and the mean SI was 5.4 days (SD = 4.5; 95% CI: 4.3, 6.5). The reproduction number was between 3.9 and 6.0, and the doubling time was 1.3 days. The time-varying reproduction number (Rt) was below one (Rt = 0.91; 95% credible interval: 0.62, 1.32) by the 13th day of the epidemic. Epidemic control was achieved through a combination of public health measures, with emphasis on a test-isolate-trace approach supplemented by travel restrictions and moderate physical distancing measures but no actual lockdown. Regular and ongoing testing of high-risk groups to supplement the existing surveillance program and a phased easing of physical distancing measures has helped maintain suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak in Brunei, as evidenced by the identification of only six additional cases from April 5 to August 5, 2020.

How to keep patients and staff safe from accidental SARS-CoV-2 exposure in the emergency room: Lessons from South Korea's explosive COVID-19 outbreak.

OBJECTIVES: We report our experience with an emergency room (ER) shutdown related to an accidental exposure to a patient with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) who had not been isolated. SETTING: A 635-bed, tertiary-care hospital in Daegu, South Korea. METHODS: To prevent nosocomial transmission of the disease, we subsequently isolated patients with suspected symptoms, relevant radiographic findings, or epidemiology. Severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction assays (RT-PCR) were performed for most patients requiring hospitalization. A universal mask policy and comprehensive use of personal protective equipment (PPE) were implemented. We analyzed effects of these interventions. RESULTS: From the pre-shutdown period (February 10-25, 2020) to the post-shutdown period (February 28 to March 16, 2020), the mean hourly turnaround time decreased from 23:31 ±6:43 hours to 9:27 ±3:41 hours (P < .001). As a result, the proportion of the patients tested increased from 5.8% (N=1,037) to 64.6% (N=690) (P < .001) and the average number of tests per day increased from 3.8±4.3 to 24.7±5.0 (P < .001). All 23 patients with COVID-19 in the post-shutdown period were isolated in the ER without any problematic accidental exposure or nosocomial transmission. After the shutdown, several metrics increased. The median duration of stay in the ER among hospitalized patients increased from 4:30 hours (interquartile range [IQR], 2:17-9:48) to 14:33 hours (IQR, 6:55-24:50) (P < .001). Rates of intensive care unit admissions increased from 1.4% to 2.9% (P = .023), and mortality increased from 0.9% to 3.0% (P = .001). CONCLUSIONS: Problematic accidental exposure and nosocomial transmission of COVID-19 can be successfully prevented through active isolation and surveillance policies and comprehensive PPE use despite longer ER stays and the presence of more severely ill patients during a severe COVID-19 outbreak.

The principle of distance during COVID-19 outbreak in Korea.

The majority of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Korea have been related to mass infection. The nation must urgently promote the distance awareness approach during emergency response and discourage the distance unawareness approach. Other nations may also apply the principle of distance to their pandemic management.

[Results of a healthcare organization model for COVID-19 on hemodialysis in a tertiary hospital and its subsidized centers]. / Resultados de un modelo de organización asistencial para COVID-19 en hemodiálisis en un hospital terciario y sus centros concertados.

The experience of a tertiary hospital and four hemodialysis centers attached to it during the COVID-19 epidemic is described. The organization of care that has been carried out and the clinical course of the 16cases of COVID-19 in hemodialysis patients are summarized. The joint application of measures, including patient screening, the early investigation of possible cases, the isolation of confirmed, investigational or contact cases, as well as the use of individual protection measures, has enabled the epidemic to be controlled. The clinical course of these 16patients is compared with the series published by the Wuhan University Hospital and with the data from the COVID-19 infection registry of the Spanish Society of Nephrology. In our experience, and unlike what was reported by the Wuhan Center, COVID-19 disease in hemodialysis patients is severe in a significant percentage of cases, and high lethality is mostly caused by the infection itself. Measures to contain the epidemic are effective.

Management of COVID-19 Response in a Secure Forensic Mental Health Setting: Réponse à la gestion de la COVID-19 dans un établissement sécurisé de santé mentale et de psychiatrie légale.

OBJECTIVES: The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic presents major challenges to places of detention, including secure forensic hospitals. International guidance presents a range of approaches to assist in decreasing the risk of COVID-19 outbreaks as well as responses to manage outbreaks of infection should they occur. METHODS: We conducted a literature search on pandemic or outbreak management in forensic mental health settings, including gray literature sources, from 2000 to April 2020. We describe the evolution of a COVID-19 outbreak in our own facility, and the design, and staffing of a forensic isolation unit. RESULTS: We found a range of useful guidance but no published experience of implementing these approaches. We experienced outbreaks of COVID-19 on two secure forensic units with 13 patients and 10 staff becoming positive. One patient died. The outbreaks lasted for 41 days on each unit from declaration to resolution. We describe the approaches taken to reduction of infection risk, social distancing and changes to the care delivery model. CONCLUSIONS: Forensic secure settings present major challenges as some proposals for pandemic management such as decarceration or early release are not possible, and facilities may present challenges to achieve sustained social distancing. Assertive testing, cohorting, and isolation units are appropriate responses to these challenges.

SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: An overview.

By the end of May 2020, SARS-CoV-2 pandemic caused more than 350,000 deaths worldwide. In the first months, there have been uncertainties on almost any area: infection transmission route, virus origin and persistence in the environment, diagnostic tests, therapeutic approach, high-risk subjects, lethality, and containment policies. We provide an updated summary of the current knowledge on the pandemic, discussing the available evidence on the effectiveness of the adopted mitigation strategies.